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The Role of Bounties and Human Behavior
on Louisiana Nutria Harvests
Cheikhna Dedah, Richard F. Kazmierczak, Jr., and
Walter R. Keithly, Jr.
In response to nutria-linked degradation of much of its coastal wetlands, Louisiana established
the Coastwide Nutria Control Program (CNCP) in January 2002.CNCP instituted, among other
things, an ‘‘economic incentive payment’’ of $4.00 per delivered nutria tail from registered
participants in the program. To examine whether this bounty has had an impact on nutria
harvest and whether alternative bounty levels can, in general, generate additional harvesting
activities, we developed a bioeconomic supply model that relates Louisiana’s annual nutria
harvests to a suite of economic and environmental factors. Results suggested that the annual
nutria harvest is responsive to both the price received per animal and costs. Results also sug-
gestedthatthenutriaharvesthas increasedas aresultofthebounty,butthattheinitialbountyof
$4.00 per tail may be insufficient to achieve the state’s goal of harvesting 400,000 animals per
year but that a bounty equal to $5.00 per tail would likely achieve the stated goal.
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Nutria (Myocastor coypus) is a large, semi-
aquaticrodentnativetoSouthAmericathatwas
introduced to Louisiana in 1938 for farm-based
fur production purposes (Lowery, 1974; Nowak
and Ernest 1991). Shortly after its introduction,
a small number were either intentionally re-
leased and/or escaped into the coastal marshes.
Having few natural predators in its new envi-
ronment, nutria populations expanded rapidly
and,togetherwithdemandfortheirfurpelts,led
to the establishment of a viable commercial
trapping industry by the late 1940s (Lowery,
1974). This trapping pressure is thought to have
kept nutria populations at levels consistent with
the long-run carrying capacity of the coastal
marsheswherenutriafedontherootstructuresof
aquatic vegetation. Encouraged bymarket prices
for fur pelts in Europe and the subsistence econ-
omy of many coastal Louisiana communities,
harvestsofnutriarangedfrom1to2millionpelts
annuallyformuchofthe1960sand1970s(Figure
1) (Marx, Mouton, and Linscombe, 2004).
The demand for nutria pelts, and thus pelt
prices, began to decline in the early 1980s with
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Europe and the United States, the increas-
ing acceptance of synthetic fur products, and
relatively mild winter conditions in many tra-
ditional fur-importing regions (Figure 1)
(Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fish-
eries, 2005). Nutria harvests declined from an
average of 1.5 million pelts annually in the
1970s to an average of 790,000 pelts annually
during the 1980s, only to be followed by a fur-
ther decline in the 1990s to an average annual
harvest of 190,000 pelts. By the turn of the
century, nutria harvests had fallen to less than
30,000 pelts annually. This greatly reduced
trapping pressure, in conjunction with nutria’s
high reproductive rate and lack of predators, led
to population increases and range expansion,
followed by foraging-linked degradation of
many coastal wetlands. For example, a 2001
aerial survey estimated that more than 83,000
coastal acres were damaged by nutria, a figure
considered conservative as the aerial surveys
were only capable of detecting severe damage
(Marx, Mouton, and Linscombe, 2004).
In response to this nutria-inflicted wetland
damage, Louisiana established the Coastwide
Nutria Control Program (CNCP) in January
2002. Supported by funds from the U.S. Coastal
Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration
Act, CNCP instituted an ‘‘economic incentive
payment’’ of $4.00 per delivered nutria tail
from registered participants in the program.
The official program goal was to ‘‘encourage
the harvest of up to 400,000 nutria annually
from coastal Louisiana’’ (Louisiana Depart-
ment of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2005). In this
paper we present a framework for analyzing the
potential role of bounties in controlling an in-
vasive vertebrate species (i.e., nutria) under
conditions where native environmental assets
are severely threatened and direct management
responseishamperedbybudgetary,personnel,and
geographic constraints. To do so, we developed
a bioeconomic model of nutria harvesting in
Louisiana and use the model to estimate expected
change in harvests associated with introducing
various monetary incentives (i.e., bounties).
Modeling Considerations
The economic literature on the management of
renewable resources emphasizes the need to
examine the supply-side relationships between
harvests and harvesting effort, with the ultimate
goal of linking harvest effort to the total, av-
erage, and marginal costs of harvesting. Based
on this body of literature, if a renewable re-
source is privately owned, the long-run supply
(harvest) is determined by the marginal cost of
harvesting at different output prices. Since any
Figure 1. Annual Nutria Harvest and Average Real Price per Pelt from 1959 to 2004
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to harvest maximum sustainable yield
1 (MSY)
would result in a reduction in harvest and,
hence, revenues and profits, the supply curve
under a private ownership regime will be,
according to theory, strictly upward sloping,
approaching MSYasymptotically (Bell, 1978).
In the case of open-access resources, how-
ever, individual harvesters do not have an in-
centive to manage the resource for profit maxi-
mizationas entry into the harvesting activity and
over-harvesting cannot be controlled. To ac-
count for this behavior, Copes (1970) developed
a theoretical model that directly related cost as
a function of harvest rather than of harvesting
effort, thereby generating a long-run supply
(harvest) curve that has a backward bending
shape at prices higher than that needed to attract
the amount of effort associated with MSY. Un-
der this open-access model, long-run supply is
determined by the average cost of harvesting at
different output prices. Long-run harvest in-
creases with increases in output price up to the
point where harvest equals MSY. Prices higher
than that needed to attract an amount of effort to
harvest MSY result in a decline in supply (har-
vest) due to declining stocks (Clark, 1976;
Copes, 1970; Hartwick and Olewiler, 1986).
The theoretical relationship between the
supply curve of a renewable resource under
a private ownership regime (labeled MC
0)a n d
the supply curve of that same resource under
open-accessregime(labeledAC
0)isillustratedin
Figure 2. As indicated, under the open-access
regime, the supply curve is backward bending at
output prices beyond that necessary to attract
a level of effort needed to harvest MSY (i.e., any
output price greater than P
MSY). This feature, as
noted,isthe outcome ofthe lack ofownership of
theresourceand,hence,theabilitytomanagethe
resource for profit maximization. Given the
ability to manage the resource for profit maxi-
mization under a private ownership regime, the
supply curve becomes vertical as MSY is
approached because any level of effort in excess
of that required to harvest MSY would result in
areductioninlong-runharvestand,hence,profit.
Finally, while not shown in Figure 2, increases
(decreases) in industry input costs (e.g., the cost
of labor or capital) will, according to theory, re-
sult in a upward (downward) shift in the re-
spective long-run supply curves, implying that
a higher output price would be required to ach-
ieve any given long-run harvest.
Although the theoretical models sharply
distinguish between private ownership and
open access property rights, the distinction, in
practice, can be somewhat ‘‘clouded.’’ This
is particularly the case with respect to the
Louisiana nutria resource where harvesting acti-
vities take place under a mixed property rights
structure. Trapping mostly occurs on private
lands where landowners have exclusive rights
to any activities on their property. Trappers are
required to buy trapping permits from the state
and the harvesting season is limited to late-
November through late-February each year.
Each of these factors tends to limit the total
amount of trapping effort, thus giving nutria
some characteristics of a private resource.
However, the movement of nutria between
properties, the relatively small levels of in-
vestment required in equipment, and knowledge
for trapping suggest that trapping effort is ca-
pable of expansion beyond MSY, implying that
nutria have common property characteristics as
well.
2 Finally, being an invasive pest in the
coastal ecosystem, nutria can, as mentioned,
inflict significant wetlands degradation. To the
extent that this degradation reduces the income-
generating potential of the property, it may be in
an owner’s best interest to harvest beyond MSY.
Given the above stated characteristics as-
sociated with Louisiana nutria and harvesting
activities, it was hypothesized that the long-run
nutria supply curve could best be represented
by the open-access model for a renewable re-
source. For purposes of analysis, the number of
nutria harvested H is defined as a function of
pelt price P, trapper opportunity cost OC, and
a vector of environmental variables E:
1Maximum sustainable yield is generally defined
as the largest annual catch or yield that can be taken
from a stock under existing environmental conditions.
2In addition, about one-quarter of the coastal
wetlands are publically owned (by either the state or
federal government). Trapping is permitted on a por-
tion of these public grounds.
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The role of pelt price
3 and opportunity costs
in determining harvest can be hypothesized by
appealing to economic theory. In the case of
nutria being an open-access resource, increases
in pelt price would be expected to positively
affect harvest up to MSY, and thereafter nega-
tively affect harvest as biological constraints
reduce the number of animals available for
harvest. The effect of trapper opportunity costs,
or the value of what a trapper is giving up to
engage in trapping, is also economically un-
ambiguous, with higher opportunity costs
leading to lower harvests. These hypothesized
economic relationships are fully testable within
the modeling framework.
Hypothesizing the role of environmental
variablesindetermining harvestlevelscannotbe
done with reference to economic theory, but in-
stead depends on the specific environmental
variableschosen,howtheyaredefined,andwhat
is known about their relationship to the stock of
nutria.Threeenvironment-relatedvariableswere
used in the estimations—measures of wetland
acres, cold weather, and alligator predation.
Nutria are generally herbivorous, eating 1.13–
1.59kilogramsofvegetativematterdaily(Evans,
1970). In addition to serving as a feeding site,
wetlands also are prime breeding and nursery
grounds.Asaresult,wetlandacreageisexpected
to be positively related to nutria abundance and,
hence,nutriaharvests.Coldweather,however,is
one of the major factors limiting nutria abun-
dance and distribution in temperate regions due
to reproductive failure and direct mass-mortality
(Gosling, Baker, and Skinner, 1983; Newson,
1966; Reggiani, Boitani, and De Stefano, 1995).
Forexample,theseverewinterof1962wasfound
to have a significant mortality effect on the
Figure 2. Hypothetical Long-run Supply Curve for a Renewable Resource Under Open Access
and Private Property Regimes
3One might question whether price should be an
independent or dependent variable in the model, as
changes in price are likely to influence long-term
harvests but, in certain situations, changes in long-term
harvests may also influence price (thus suggesting the
need to estimate harvest and price in a simultaneous
equation framework). This later situation does not
appear to apply to the current study as Louisiana’s
nutria supply constitutes a small share of the world
supply and, as such, changes in Louisiana harvests are
unlikely to significantly affect world pelt price.
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fects on surviving animals as evidenced by
missing tails and feet (Lowery, 1974). Thus, the
cold-weather variable is hypothesized to be
negatively related to nutria harvest. Lastly, alli-
gators have become major predators of nutria in
Louisiana. For example, Valentine et al. (1972)
found nutria remains in 56% of alligator stom-
achs, while Wolfe, Bradshaw, and Chabreck
(1987) concluded that approximately 60% of
alligator diets by weight consisted of nutria. As
a result, it was hypothesized that increases (de-
creases)inalligatorpopulationsleadtodecreases
(increases)innutriaharvestsduetotheeffectsof
predation on nutria stocks.
Given the general relationships described
above, the long-run nutria supply curve was
estimated based on the following model
4:
(2)
lnðHHÞt5b0 1b1   lnPt 1b2   Pt 1b3   OCt
1b4   alligatort 1b5   freezet 1b6
  cncp1et
where lnðHHtÞ is the natural logarithm of har-
vest quantity per hectare of coastal wetlands in
year t, Pt is the deflated pelt price received by
trappersinyear t, OCt representsthe opportunity
cost measured by the annual unemployment rate
in year t for six coastal parishes in Louisiana,
alligatort is the estimated number of alligator
nests in year t (in thousands), freezet represents
a winter severity index in year t, cncp is a binary
variable indicating the years (2002–2004) in
which the Coastwide Nutria Control Program
was operating
5,a n det represent the estimation
error term. Harvest per hectare (HHt) was used
as a dependentvariabledue tothe high degree of
collinearity in the data for wetlands coverage
and alligator nests, thus necessitating the elim-
ination of one of those factors from the explicit
vector of independent variables.
Data and Estimation Procedure
Data used in this analysis are annual time series
data covering the period 1960–2004.
6 In total,
45 observations were used in the analysis. Pelts
harvested and the nominal price received by
trappers were collected from data maintained
by the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries, with nominal prices deflated using
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and
Statistics implicit price deflator (base year
2000). The price used for estimation purposes
included the average price paid to the har-
vesters for pelts which were sold plus any
bounty received for the harvested product.
7
Coastal wetland coverage, a value that has
not been consistently measured over the study
time period, was calculated with 1968 as a base
year and using Turner’s (1997) estimated annual
wetland loss values to determine cumulative
losses through any given year.
8 Unemployment
rates, used to develop the index of opportunity
costs, were from the six coastal Louisiana par-
ishes (Plaquemines, St. Bernard, Terrebonne,
Vermilion, Calcasieu, and Cameron) having the
majority of nutria harvests. The annual average
unemployment rate for 1970–2001 was calcu-
lated by summing the number of unemployed in
the six-parish area and dividing by the sum of
4For comparison purposes, the following private–
property rights based model was also estimated:
lnðHHÞt 5b01b1   1
Pt 1b2   OCt1b3   alligatort1b4  
freezet 1b5   cncp1et. While results associated with
this model are not discussed in the paper, they were, in
general, not significantly different from the results
associated with the open–access regime model.
5This binary variable is used as a supply shifter in
the equation. Specifically, registered participants in the
CNCP were given the option of using firearms in lieu
of traps when taking nutria. The variable cncp is
included in the analysis in an attempt to ‘‘capture’’
the expected difference in cost per unit harvest be-
tween firearms and traps and any effect this difference
may have on supply.
6The Louisiana nutria trapping season runs from
November through February of the following year,
with the reported harvest and prices received spanning
the calendar year change. For purposes of this study,
the data were attributed to the year in which the
trapping season started (e.g., data for the November
1960 to February 1961 season is referred to as the 1960
data). Given significant displacement of many nutria
trappers due to 2005 hurricanes, the analysis has been
extended till 2004.
7Because the bounty is relatively high compared
with the pelt price in recent years, some participants in
the program collected the bounty but did not sell the
harvested pelts.
8Total coastal Louisiana wetlands in 1968 were
estimated to be 3,858,082 acres (Louisiana Wildlife
and Fisheries Commission (1970)).
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erage state unemployment rate was used as
a proxy from1960through1969because parish-
level data were unavailable prior to 1970.
Overall, the annual unemployment rate, which
averaged 7.4% during the period of analysis,
ranged from a low of 4.3% in 1966 to a high of
more than 15% in 1986.
Although an annual estimate of alligator
numbers was not available for our study, the
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,
using aerial surveys, has collected data on the
number of alligator nests since 1971 (Newsom,
Joanen, and Haward, 1987). Kelly (2004) esti-
mated that the alligator population recovery rate
was approximately 13% in the 1971–1972 pe-
riod, and this rate was used to back-calculate
number of nests from 1960 through 1970. The
resulting 1960–2004 time series of alligator
nests was used as a proxy for alligator predation
on nutria in the estimations. Overall, the number
of nests averaged about 19 thousand annually
and ranged from about 1.5 thousand in 1961 to
almost 50 thousand in recent years.
The winter severity index was calculated
from meteorological data (New Orleans Audu-
bon Weather Center, National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration) using the Reggiani,







where i is a run of successive freezing days (24
hours period where minimum temperatures do
not exceed 0° Celsius) in the winter season, x is
the length of the run, and n is the number of
runs in a winter season. The index, which av-
eraged 15.04 annually during the study period
showed a high degree of variability with
a range from 0 to 64.
The supply model expressed in Equation (2)
was estimated over the 1960–2004 period of
study using Proc Autoreg procedure in the SAS
software package. The value of Durbin-Watson
test suggested that first order serial correlation
might be a problem, which was corrected using
NLAG option in Proc Autoreg.
Empirical Results
The parameter estimates of the model after
correcting for first-order serial correlation are
presented in Table 1. The explanatory power of
the model was high with about 95% of the
variation in the dependent variable being
explained by the suite of explanatory variables
included in the analysis. All estimated param-
eters except for the one associated with the
variable freeze were significant at 5% level of
significance, and in-sample predictions using
the estimated model appear to adequately de-
scribe the observed nutria harvests over the
period of analysis (Figure 3). To evaluate the
robustness of the model to the time framework,
the supply model was estimated using data
covering the period 1970–2004.
9,10 In general,






intercept 24.7944 0.4114 <0.0001
ln(price) 2.5828 0.2974 <0.0001
price 20.1792 0.0386 <0.0001
opportunity cost 0.1129 0.0242 <0.0001
alligator 20.0174 0.0060 0.0064
freeze 0.0025 0.0025 0.3247
cncp 0.5584 0.2654 0.0422
DW 5 1.80 SSE 5 3.0191 MSE 5 0.0816 R2 5 0.948
9The data analysis for this paper was generated
using SAS software, Version 9.1 of the SAS system for
Windows. Copyright  2009 SAS Institute Inc.
10Robustness of the model results to starting date
was examined, in part, because of the missing data in
the earlier years on unemployment rates by parish and
alligator populations.
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the timeframe used for analysis.
The negative parameter estimate on the
variable price and positive parameter estimate
on the variable ln(price) indicated that harvests
initially increase as price increases, but at
a decreasing rate. For price increases beyond
a point, harvests will begin to fall as the in-
fluence of the negative parameter is out-
weighed by the influence of the positive pa-
rameter estimate. Thus, data used for the
estimated model do reflect the hypothesized
backward-bending supply curve that might be
expected in an open-access resource, and the
point where it begins to bend backward being
equal to MSY. Beyond the price variables, the
positive sign on opportunity cost indicated that
as unemployment rises, the cost of expending
labor on trapping activity falls, thus increasing
trapping effort and nutria harvests (up to MSY).
Similarly, the negative sign associated with the
alligator variable is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that increases in alligator numbers,
increases the predation rate on nutria, thereby
reducing nutria stock available for harvest. The
significance and positive magnitude on the
parameter estimate for cncp indicated that the
change in regulation that provided increased
flexibility with respect to permissible har-
vesting methods resulted in an increase in
harvest; likely the result of a reduction in cost
per unit harvest.
The estimated elasticities (calculated at the
sample means) for all continuous variables in
the model and their associated standard errors
are reported in Table 2. All elasticity estimates
are statistically significant at 5% level of sig-
nificance and exhibit the expected signs. A 1%
increase in price per pelt that the trappers re-
ceived was found to result in 1.34% increase in
the long-run harvest of nutria. Similarly, a 1%
increase in the unemployment rate (OC) was
associated with a 0.83% increase in the long-
run nutria harvest. Finally, a 1% increase in
alligator population will result in a 0.34% de-
crease in the long-run nutria harvest, ceteris
paribus.
Figure 3. Observed and Predicted Annual Harvests









Opportunity Cost 0.834 0.126
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As stated by Bax et al. (2003) ‘‘[s]cientists and
policy makers increasingly see the introduction
of alien species as a major threat to marine
biodiversity and a contributor to environmental
change.’’ The authors further state that as
such...‘‘management responses need to cover
a diverse range of human activity.’’ While the
use of bounties has been criticized for both its
efficacy and ethical implications, monetary
incentives do have the potential to encourage
specific types of harvester behavior and, in
particular, may encourage the harvesting of
invasive species that cause significant envi-
ronmental damage in their adopted habitat
(Bulte and Rondeau, 2005). The goal of pro-
tecting coastal and marine environments from
invasive species avoids many ethical and moral
hazard questions associated with the historical
use of bounties because economic incentives
are specifically designed to promote overall
environmental management objectives. For
such policies to be effective, however, bounties
need to be appropriately structured and imple-
mented, and this requires information on how
human agents will react to different bounty
levels.
Having controlled for environmental fac-
tors, the estimated models suggested that
Louisiana nutria trappers responded to eco-
nomic factors, including monetary incentives.
As suggested by theory, increasing prices had
a positive influence on harvest (up to MSY)
while opportunity costs exhibited a negative
influence.
The statistical significance of the model
suggested that the model can be used to fore-
cast the relationship between harvests and pri-
ces for given values of other variables in the
model. Under the assumption of open access
scenario, the long run nutria supply curve is
presented in Figure 4. This backward bending
supply curve is generated by setting all envi-
ronmental variables and the unemployment rate
at recent (2004–2005) values. Under this set of
Figure 4. A Long-run Nutria Supply Curve (curve generated by setting all explanatory variables
at their values in 2004–2005 season and varying the value of the deflated price)
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crease as the price (represented by the market
price supplemented any bounty) increases until
an MSY of 1.27 million animals is reached.
After that, an increase in price will lead to
a decrease in harvest.
Another application of the estimated supply
model was to predict harvest quantities asso-
ciated with different bounty levels, assuming
all other variables were fixed at 2004 levels.
Generally speaking, the bounty supplements
the existing market price. Given that the $4.00
bounty was large relative to the existing market
price, however, the bounty led to the undesired
effect of discouraging trappers from un-
dertaking the laborious task of skinning and
readying the product for sale.
11 Predicted har-
vest associated with various bounties levels and
the associated confidence intervals are pre-
sented in Table 3. As indicated, results suggest
that an economic incentive of $4.00 per de-
livered tail may not be sufficient to achieve the
stated harvesting goal of the program (400,000
nutria annually). Specifically, the predicted
harvest at a $4.00 bounty is only 288 thousand
animals, which is about 110 thousand animals
less than the stated goal. In fact, the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries recog-
nized that the program was falling short of its
goal and announced in September 2006 that
the bounty would be increased to $5.00 per
delivered tail for the 2006–2007 season. As
indicated by the information in Table 3, this
bounty is likely to achieve the program’s goal.
Despite the apparent ability of the open-
access model to accurately predict harvest and
the effects of various bounties, discussion of
one shortcoming of the model is warranted. As
previously noted, increases (decreases) in in-
dustry costs (i.e., unemployment rate in this
analysis) should, according to theory, result in
an upward (downward) shift in the long-run
yield curve with no change in the curve shape.
Hence, MSYis not affected by the industry cost
structure. While regression limitations preclude
incorporation of this concept in applied analy-
sis, results of our current analysis illustrate that
changes in industry costs have an impact on
long-run yield.
Conclusions
The study results indicated that Louisiana trap-
persrespondstronglytopriceincentivesandthat
a bounty, under various conditions, can be suc-
cessful at encouraging trappers to increase har-
vestingforthepurposeofcontrollinganinvasive
vertebrate species. Although there are alterna-
tive methods for managing the nutria population
including chemical control (toxicants), induced
infertility, and chemical repellents, the upfront
costs required to successfully implement these
methods and the concerns about their negative
effects on other nontargeted species are major
limiting factors (Genesis Laboratories, Inc.
2002). On the other hand, the bounty method
can be cost effective and easy to manage since it
requires a minimum of direct involvement by










4 171,054 287,524 458,215
5 234,535 391,579 619,848
6 318,270 531,383 841,152
8 475,868 802,151 1,281,975
10 600,185 1,024,970 1,659,552
12 678,761 1,178,625 1,940,385
14 709,071 1,260,203 2,123,463
11As an indication of this fact, the reported price
received by trappers during the 2002–2004 period
averaged just $4.29 per animal. For purposes of
analysis, it is assumed that no market sales would
occur at bounties in excess of $4.00.
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ence of Louisiana suggested that the costs and
acceptability of alternative methods must be
carefully weighed when constructing an in-
vasive species control program. For example,
the bounty program in Louisiana has appar-
ently received little opposition due, in part, to
the fact that the linkage of nutria population to
wetland degradation has been well established
and the benefits of a healthy wetland ecosystem
were understood by the public.
[Received July 2009; Accepted November 2009.]
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